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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES. 
This case does not involve any statutes, constitutional provisions, ordinances, or court 
rules. Appellants seek reversal based upon the trial court's failure to properly apply common 
law. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Statement of Jurisdiction at page 1 in the Brief of 
the Appellants is incorporated by this reference. 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by 
ruling, based on its findings of fact, that the Appellees were 
not liable for interfering with the prospective economic ad-
vantage of the Appellants ? 
II. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by 
finding that the Appellees were acting within their rights in 
initiating their law suit against the Appellants ? 
The standard for review with regard to each of these issues 
is as stated at page 1 of the Brief of the Appellants. 
The Brief of the Appellants does not cite the record show-
ing where either of these issues has been preserved in the trial 
court, and it does not state the grounds for seeking review of 
an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The matter before the trial court involved a dispute 
between the parties as to: (1) whether or not they had entered 
into a contract for the sale of real property; (2) whether or not 
the appellees were acting within their rights to initiate the law 
suit and to record a lis pendens giving notice of that law suit; 
(3) whether or not the appellees slandered the title of the 
appellants to the property; (4) whether or not the appellees 
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tortiously interfered with the prospective economic relations 
of the appellants; and (5) whether or not the appellants were 
liable to the appellees for the return of their $3,000 earnest 
money deposit. 
Each of these issues was resolved after an evidentiary 
hearing in the trial court. The first was resolved in favor of 
the appellants. The remaining four were resolved in favor of the 
appellees. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Course of Proceedings is as stated at page 2 of the 
Brief of the Appellants. 
C. Disposition by the Trial Court 
The statement at page 4 in the Brief of the Appellants is 
not accurate. Although the trial court did not hear further evi-
dence after the appellants rested their case, there was consider-
able evidence on the record which disputed the evidence presented 
by the appellants and which, together with the insufficiency of 
the appellants1 own evidence, provided the trial court with the 
evidentiary basis for its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts which begins at page 4 in the Brief 
of the Appellants does not accurately and fully reflect the 
record. However it is the law, not the facts, which is at issue 
in this appeal. If the appellants had chosen to attack the trial 
court's findings of fact, they would have had to marshall the 
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evidence in so doing. The appellants have done neither. There-
fore, for purposes of this appeal, the facts are those which the 
trial court found. 
The trial court's findings of fact are included in the 
Addendum to this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should deny this appeal for five reasons. 
(1) The issues on appeal have not been preserved in 
the trial court. 
The general rule of law in Utah is that appellate courts 
will not consider on appeal issues which the trial court has 
not been given an opportunity to correct before appeal. Appel-
lants have not cited where in the record they have preserved the 
issues for which the appeal is sought. 
(2) The appellants have not stated with precision the 
relief which they seek on appeal. 
Here the appellants fail to comply with Rule 24 (a) (1) , 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This error is relatively harm-
less and may be remedied in the Appellants1 Reply Brief. There-
fore there will be no elaboration on this argument below. 
(3) The law as cited by the appellants, when applied to 
the trial court's findings of fact, supports the trial court's 
conclusions of law. 
The Brief of the Appellants ignores these procedural 
realities: (a) The trial court held two evidentiary hearings in 
this matter; (b) The trial court heard oral arguments and 
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considered affidavits in two rounds of cross-motions for summary 
judgment; and (c) The trial court made findings of fact. 
Appellants purport to argue the law, but in reality they are 
re-arguing the facts of the case. However the law is clear, and 
the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts as will be 
discussed below in greater detail. 
(4) The appellants argue the facts without marshalling 
the evidence. 
Utah appellate courts have spoken at considerable length and 
with great clarity regarding the burden of an appellant who seeks 
review of a trial court's findings of fact. Here the appellants 
present a textbook example of failing to marshall the evidence. 
They cite no point in the record which supports the trial courtfs 
decision. Indeed, they ignore a portion of the record, the trial 
court's findings of fact, which soundly supports the trial court 
on legal grounds. 
(5) Even if the appellants were to marshall the 
evidence, it would support the trial court's conclusions under 
the applicable standard of review. 
This point is now beyond the scope of this appeal, and it 
will not be addressed below in any greater detail. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The appeal should be denied because the appellants did 
not object at trial to the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
The appellants allege an error which the trial court was not 
given an opportunity to correct. In Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. 
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Llovd W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 621; 15 Utah 2d 318 (1964), 
this Court stated: 
The duty is encumbent upon counsel to give the trial 
court the opportunity to correct the error before 
asking the appellate court to reverse a verdict and 
judgment thereon. 
Now the appellants ask this Court to find error without 
having challenged at trial the findings and conclusions which are 
under attack. Here, as in Porcupine Reservoir Co., this Court 
should deny the appeal and affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
II. The trial court correctly applied the law, relying on 
factual findings that: (a) Appellees recorded the lis 
pendens in good faith and upon the advice of counsel; 
(b) Appellees acted to preserve what they believed to 
be their right to pursue the remedy of specific 
performance; (c) Appellees did not act for an improper 
purpose or by an improper means; and (d) Appellees were 
acting within their rights in initiating the law suit. 
Appellants get off on the wrong foot by casting the first of 
their two issues in terms of whether or not they had established 
a prima facie case of wrongful interference. See Brief of the 
Appellants, p. 1. Here they confuse a dismissal under Rule 41 
(b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with what we have in this 
case, a decision by the trial court on the merits. See Sorensen 
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App. 
1994). Perhaps this misdirection accounts for the appellants1 
failure to consider the trial court's findings of fact with its 
conclusions of law. 
Appellants correctly rely on Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. 
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) in setting forth the law which 
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applies in this case. In Leigh Furniture this Court noted the re-
quirement that good faith must be absent for tortious conduct to 
be present. See Id. at 3 08 cited at page 10 in the Brief of the 
Appellants. However, the appellants disregard the finding of the 
trial court that appellees acted in good faith. See Addendum, 
Finding 7. 
Again appellants correctly rely on GS Enterprises v. 
Falmouth Marine, 571 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1991) in noting the need 
to focus on whether or not there existed a genuine dispute and 
probable cause to believe that the suit would succeed. See Brief 
of the Appellants, pp 14-15. However, the appellants disregard 
the finding of the trial court that the appellees acted within 
their rights in filing the law suit. See Addendum, Finding 11. 
Also itfs difficult to second guess the trial court's finding 
that the appellees did not act for an improper purpose or by an 
improper means if one recalls that the trial court found the par-
ties1 agreement to be ambiguous and that the trial court needed 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties1 
intent. 
Above all else, it's a challenge to imagine that the appel-
lants argue there was not dispute and that probable cause was 
lacking when the appellants retained the $3000.00 earnest money 
deposit of the appellees while arguing, and with the trial court 
agreeing, that no contract existed. This the appellants contended 
while now they continue to allege in the brief that the Appellees 
"backed out of and cancelled" their purchase agreement. See Brief 
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of the Appellants, p. 16. 
III. Utah law prohibits the appellants from arguing the 
facts without marshalling the evidence. 
Utah law with regard the failure by an appellant to take 
into account a trial court's findings of fact is stated in no 
uncertain terms by this Court in Matter of Estate of Beesley, 
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). There this Court found that the 
findings of fact by the trial court were sufficient to support 
its conclusions of law. This Court went on to state: 
Again, to successfully challenge findings such as 
these, an appellant must first marshall all of the 
evidence that supports the findings and then 
demonstrate that even in viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the ... [trial] court, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding. Id. 
In an earlier case, this Court sustained the findings and 
conclusions of a trial court, reasoning as follows: 
...[Appellant's] brief presents the conflicting evi-
dence in a light most favorable to his position and 
largely ignores the contrary evidence. Therefore, 
there is no reason for us to disturb the trial court's 
findings. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-9 
(Utah 1989). 
A fortiori, in the case now before this Court, the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed because the Brief of the 
Appellants ignores all of the evidence which is contrary to its 
position. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the appeal should be denied and the de-
cision of the trial court affirmed. Additionally, appellees ask 
that this Court order the appellants to pay appellees1 costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in defending 
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against this appeal. 
DATED this 12th day of Octa 
Thomas 
for Plainti 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that this Brief of Appellees was served upon the 
Appellants on this 12th day of October, 1995, by mailing, 
postage pre-paid, true copies of it to Stephen B. Elggren, 
Elggren & Van Dyke, 2469 EagLt^Fort Union Blvd. #2 02, SaJATT^^e 
City, UT 84121. 
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Trial Courtfs Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law 
four pages 
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Thomas F. Rogan (4506) 
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and 
Shirleen C. Davis 
136 South Main Street, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 8 01-355-04 61 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Plaintiffs 
-vs-
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants 
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
-vs-
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
Before coming to trial on May 5, 1995, the Court ad-
dressed substantive issues raised in this matter on two 
occasions: the first, by Minute Entry on January 18, 1995, 
after having determined that the Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment of Mr, Huish and Mr, and Mrs. Davis was ambiguous on 
its face and after having received extrinsic evidence at 
MAY 161995 
F 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case 930902664PR 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
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a hearing on December 10, 1994, to resolve the ambiguity of 
the Agreement; and the second, ruling on Defendants7 Motion 
for Summary Judgment by granting partial declaratory relief 
to quiet title based on the Court's January Minute Entry. 
Now having considered further evidence at trial on 
May 5, 1995, the Court enters Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law as follow. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court provided the parties an with ex-
pedited hearing on December 10, 1994, to consider extrinsic 
evidence in an effort to resolve the ambiguous Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement ("the Agreement") between Mr. Huish 
and Mr. and Mrs. Davis. 
2. The evidence presented at the hearing 
showed that the parties had substantially different under-
standings with regard to the price which would be paid 
for the property which was the subject of the Agreement 
and thus failed to resolve the ambiguity of the Agreement. 
3. The payment terms and price to be paid for 
the property were material elements of the parties' Agree-
ment. 
4. Given the lack of agreement on these mater-
ial elements, there was no meeting of the minds between 
the parties to the Agreement. 
5. On May 12, 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Davis through 
counsel filed suit and recorded with the Office of the Salt 
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Lake County Recorder a Lis Pendens giving notice of the 
pendency of this action and the relief sought by them. 
6. On May 21, 1993, Mr- Huish through counsel 
demanded under Utah Code Section 38-9-1 that the plain-
tiffs remove the Lis Pendens, 
7 • The Plaintiffs recorded the Lis Pendens 
in good faith and upon the advice of counsel to preserve 
what they believed to be their right to pursue the remedy 
of specific performance under the Agreement. 
8. The Plaintiffs intentionally filed this 
law suit and recorded the Lis Pendens. 
9• The recording of the Lis Pendens inter-
fered with the prospective economic relations of the 
Defendants, 
10. The Plaintiffs did not act for an improper 
purpose or by an improper means when they filed the law 
suit or recorded the Lis Pendens. 
11. The Plaintiffs were acting within their 
rights by initiating this law suit. 
12. The Plaintiffs deposited $3,000 as earnest 
money under their Agreement with Mr. Huish. 
14. By the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Huish 
was to return the $3,000 deposit to the Plaintiffs if 
they were unable to complete the transaction under the 
terms of the Agreement deemed ambiguous by the Court. 
15. Mr. Huish has not returned the $3,000 
earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As previously determined by the Court: 
(a) the Agreement between Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs. 
Davis is ambiguous on its face; 
(b) there was no contract between Mr. Huish and Mr. 
and Mrs. Davis; and 
(c) title has been quieted in favor of Mr. Huish. 
2. Mr. and Mrs. Davis have not slandered 
Defendants7 title to the property. 
3. Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable for 
interfering with the prospective economic advantage 
of the Defendants. 
4. Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable to 
the Defendants' by reason of their having filed this 
law suit. 
5. The Defendants are not entitled to recover 
damages from Mr. and Mrs. Davis. 
6. However, Mr. and Mrs Davis are entitled to 
recover from the Defendants their $3,000 earnest money 
which has not been returned to them. 
DATED this j- J day of May, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tyrone E. Medley 
District Judge 
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